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Abstract
What determines the enforcement of deregulation reform of business activities?
What are the outcomes of deregulation? We address these questions using an episode
of a drastic reform in Russia between 2001 and 2004 which liberalized registration,
licensing, and inspections. Based on the analysis of micro-level panel data on regu-
latory burden, we find that: 1) The reform reduced administrative costs of firms, on
average; but, the progress of reform had substantial geographical variation. 2) The
enforcement of deregulation reform was better in regions with a transparent govern-
ment, low corruption, strong fiscal incentives (i.e., reliance of local budgets on local
taxes rather than fiscal transfers) and a powerful industrial lobby. 3) Using the exoge-
nous variation in regulation generated by the interaction of reform and its institutional
determinants, we find a substantial positive effect of deregulation on entry and small
business employment and no effect on pollution and morbidity. The results support
the “tollbooth” theory of the nature of regulation and are inconsistent with either the
public interest theory or the regulatory capture theory.
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What is the nature of regulation? What are the consequences of deregulation of busi-
ness activity? Recently, these questions have come to the center of attention of much of
development literature, which was motivated by varying experiences throughout the world.1
Deregulation has also become popular among policymakers: in 2005 and 2006, fifty five
countries undertook reforms that lowered administrative costs of starting a business and
obtaining a license (World Bank, 2006). Little, however, is known about how deregulation
reforms are enforced. What are the obstacles and driving forces behind the implementation
of deregulation reforms? Which conditions are necessary for a deregulation reform started
by the central government to yield desired results at the local level, where much of the reg-
ulation takes place? Despite the relevance of these questions both for policy and for the
theory of regulation, so far there has been a dearth of empirical research on them. In this
paper we address these questions using a unique combination of a deregulation policy ex-
periment undertaken in Russia in the early 2000s and a detailed panel data on the actual
regulatory burden on firms that spans a selection of 20 regions. This combination allows us
to study the institutional determinants of regional reform progress controlling for all time-
invariant characteristics of firms (and regions) as well as for the changes in macro-economic
environment.
Between 2001 and 2004, Russia passed laws that drastically simplified procedures and
reduced red tape associated with entry regulation – registration and licensing – and with
regulation of existing business – inspections. The laws introduced clear measurable limits to
regulatory burden in several specific areas of regulation. For example, the laws established
that registering a business requires a trip to just one government agency (“one-stop shop”)
and takes no more than a week; each inspecting agency (e.g., fire, sanitary, labor, or certi-
fication inspection) comes to inspect a business no more frequently than once in two years;
licenses are valid for no less than five years. In addition, there was a substantial delicensing,
1See, for instance, Djankov et al. (2002); Bertrand and Kramarz (2002); Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer (2003); Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer (2003); Botero et al.
(2004); Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2004); Shleifer (2005); Mulligan and Shleifer (2004, 2005); Djankov,
McLiesh and Ramalho (2006); Aghion et al. (2005, 2006).
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i.e., a number of business activities which previously had required licenses were exempt from
licensing. Prior to the reform, many scholars pointed to the excessive regulatory burden on
Russian firms and argued that over-regulation was among the most important reasons for
its poor economic performance during the first eight years of transition.2 The proclaimed
goal of the reform was to induce entry and growth of small business.
This paper addresses three distinct questions about this reform: First, we examine
whether the reform succeed in bringing down administrative costs of firms. Second, we study
which institutional factors affected the level of enforcement of deregulation laws in different
regions. And third, we estimate a causal effect of deregulation on outcomes, i.e., entry, SME
employment, morbidity, and pollution using the exogenous variation in regulation generated
by the interaction of reform and its institutional determinants.
Jointly with a team of expects from an independent Moscow think tank, CEFIR, we
collected a unique data set entitled “Monitoring of Administrative Barriers to Small business”
(MABS). The data come from regularly-repeated surveys of 2,000 firms in 20 regions of
Russia about their actual levels of regulatory burden in each area of regulation affected
by the reform. Firm-level panel data are collected to measure the dynamics of regulatory
burden on existing firms and a repeated cross-section of newly-registered firms is collected
to measure changes in the regulation of entry. The data allow observing directly the level of
enforcement of each measurable target in the deregulation laws.
First, we investigate whether the de jure reform had an effect on de facto regulations.
To estimate the effect of the enactment of deregulation laws on regulatory burden, we use
the difference in timing of enactment of different deregulation laws (i.e., laws on registra-
tion, licensing, and inspections). We estimate the average impact of the enactment of a
deregulation law on regulatory burden in the specific area of regulation affected by this law
with difference-in-differences methodology under the assumption that in the absence of re-
form, trends in regulatory burden in different areas of regulations would have been the same.
2See, for instance, Frye and Shleifer (1997); Shleifer (1997); Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1998);
Shleifer and Vishny (1998); Frye and Zhuravskaya (2000).
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We control for all time-invariant regional characteristics, macro-economic shocks, and even
region-specific trends. We find that, on average, the enactment of a deregulation law leads
to a significant reduction in regulatory burden.3
Next, we address the question of the driving forces behind the implementation of reform.
We estimate the differential impact of the federal deregulation laws on regulatory burden de-
pending on the pre-reform regional institutional environment using difference-in-differences
methodology. We explore the fact that the dynamics of regulatory burden in each area
of regulation exhibits vast geographical variation. Figure 2 illustrates this by presenting
regional dynamics of regulatory burden in five specific areas of regulation covered by the
reform. This identification strategy is valid under the assumption that, in the absence of
institutional variation, the average change in regulatory burden induced by a specific dereg-
ulation law would have been the same across regions. Our choice of potential determinants
of deregulation progress was motivated by the predictions of alternative theories of the na-
ture of regulation: public interest theory (Pigou, 1938) and the two alternative public choice
theories – capture theory (Stigler, 1971) and “tollbooth” theory (de Soto, 1990; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1993). We consider government transparency, corruption, media freedom, fiscal in-
centives (i.e., the extent to which regional budgets are comprised of local taxes rather than
transfers from the federal center), presence of a strong lobby by business interests (i.e., the
extent to which regional authorities are under influence of powerful industrial groups), and
resource abundance. Four factors significantly boost enforcement of deregulation laws (hold-
ing everything else constant): 1) government transparency; 2) low corruption; 3) presence of
strong industrial lobby; and 4) strong fiscal incentives. We find that the deregulation of entry
and the liberalization of regulations on established firms are affected by these institutional
characteristics in the same way.
3Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of the level of regulatory burden (right) and of the share of firms that
experienced regulatory burden in excess of the targets set by deregulation laws (left) before and after the
reform. The DD estimator of the reform impact (if considered without any additional controls), essentially,
compares the change in regulatory burden – difference in the hight of bars in Figure 1 – for the types of
regulations that had been and had not been affected by the reform at each particular point in time.
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Finally, we use the timing of reform together with institutional determinants of its en-
forcement as an exogenous source of variation in the level of regulation to test for a causal
link from deregulation to such outcomes as entry, SME employment, pollution, and public
health. We find a significant negative effect of various regulations on the the number of small
businesses (a proxy for net entry) and employment in small businesses and no effect of reg-
ulation on either pollution (measured by emission of contaminants from stationary sources
into atmosphere) or public health (measured by morbidity from injuries and poisoning per
1,000 population). It is important to note that instrumenting regulation is crucial for this
exercise because all theories of the nature of regulation presume presence of reverse causality
going from outcomes to regulation as we discuss in Section 4.
All pieces of evidence taken together allow us to evaluate the competing theories of the na-
ture of regulation. The evidence is inconsistent with the public interest theory because, first,
regions with transparent and accountable governments are the ones that achieve progress in
deregulation, and second, deregulation does not have an adverse effect on pollution or mor-
bidity. In addition, the evidence is hard to reconcile with regulatory capture theory because
we do not find differences between the effect of the presence of strong politically-powerful
lobby of industrial incumbents on entry regulation vs. regulation of existing business. Indus-
trial lobbies accelerate deregulation in all areas of regulation and do not use entry regulation
to protect themselves from potential competitors. The evidence is consistent with tollbooth
theory as the least corrupt and most fiscally-motivated governments promote deregulation
the most.
Our findings also shed light on the theory of institutional change in transition economies
by finding support to the “demand for reform” (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995) and
“fiscal federalism” (Qian and Weingast, 1996; Zhuravskaya, 2000; Jin, Qian and Weingast,
2005) theories of determinants of the reform progress.
The paper is closely related to Djankov et al. (2002) both in the theoretical approach and
in empirical findings. There are several contributions of our paper that go beyond Djankov
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et al. (2002). First, we consider the actual regulatory burden and compare it to the the official
level established by the legislation, we show that official regulations are poorly enforced and
grossly understate regulatory burden as much of the actual regulation is in excess of the
official levels. Second, we show that there is a vast variation in regulatory burden within a
country and looking only at the largest city may give a misleading picture about the state of
regulation in the country as a whole. Third, panel data allow us to control for unobserved
regional and firm-level variation as well as time trends and, therefore, substantially improve
on cross-sectional analysis of many previous studies (e.g., Djankov et al., 2002; Klapper,
Laeven and Rajan, 2004; Djankov, McLiesh and Ramalho, 2006). Fourth, we extend the
analysis beyond regulation of entry and compare the regulation of established business to
entry regulation.
Our analysis is also closely related to Aghion et al. (2006); the two papers study comple-
mentary channels through which local institutions affect outcomes of a nationwide deregu-
lation reform.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we describe the reform and the regula-
tions data. Section 2 presents hypotheses about the institutional determinants of regional
deregulation progress and describes institutional measures. Section 3 focuses on the effect of
reform on the actual regulatory burden and the institutional determinants of reform progress.
Section 4 presents the estimation of the effect regulations on outcomes. Section 5 discusses
robustness of our results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
1 Background and the measures of regulation
1.1 The reform
The goal of Russia’s deregulation reform was to speed up and simplify administrative proce-
dures, reduce red tape, and, thus, significantly cut costs of firms associated with bureaucratic
regulation in such areas as inspections, licensing, registration, and certification. The reform
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consisted of a package of laws enacted during 2001-2004. Five different laws have come into
force at different points in time: the law on inspections – on August 8, 2001; the law on
licensing – on February 11, 2002; the first redaction of the law on registration – on July
1, 2002; the law on certification (“technical regulation”) – on July 1, 2003; and the second
redaction of the law on registration – on January 1, 2004.
All of these laws (with the exception of the law on certification) introduced clear mea-
surable targets for the level of regulatory burden associated with these particular areas of
regulation (e.g., Buev, Makarova and Shehovtzov, 2005; Shehovtzov et al., 2005). The law
on inspections postulated that each inspecting agency is allowed to conduct a maximum of
one inspection in each particular firm in two years. Previous legislation did not put a limit
to the number of visits by inspectors. The law on licensing reduced the list of business activ-
ities which require licenses from 250 different activities to 103 and increased the minimum
allowed length of validity for a license from three to five years. The first redaction of the
law on registration introduced the maximum of five working days during which any firm
with all necessary documents should receive registration from the authorities (previously,
the length of registration procedure was not restricted by law). The second redaction of the
law introduced the “one-stop shop” rule for registration and formalized the list of required
documents for registration. Previously, any start-up had to register with several different
agencies, i.e., tax ministry, pension fund, social security, statistical and fire department, local
administration, etc. and the rules for registration differed across localities. According to the
new (2004) redaction of the law, all of the registration is done at a local branch of tax min-
istry.4 In addition, licensing reform reduced the official monetary fee for obtaining licenses,
but not substantially. In this paper, we focus on these measurable targets of deregulation
reform in the areas of registration, licensing, and inspections.5
4Prior to these changes, the first redaction of the deregulation law on registration decreased the number
of agencies needed for registration by one. Before that law came into force, firms needed to register both with
the registration chamber and with tax ministry among other agencies; the law of 2002 disbanded registration
chamber and moved all of its operations into the tax ministry.
5It is important to note that in addition to the laws described above on January 1, 2003 the law on sim-
plified tax system for small businesses was passed. This law introduced two changes into Russian taxation
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1.2 MABS survey
The Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR, www.cefir.org) in Moscow has
conducted a long-term project of the Monitoring of Administrative Barriers to Small busi-
ness. Within this project a unique data set on regulatory burden on Russian firms has been
collected. It allows us evaluating the progress of deregulation reforms in a selection of Rus-
sia’s regions. The MABS is based on regularly repeated surveys of top managers in 2,000
small firms in 20 regions of the Russian Federation with questions asked about firms’ actual
quantifiable costs associated with inspections, licensing, registration, certification, and tax
administration, as well as their subjective perceptions of the business climate.6 Two primary
survey instruments are used: one inquires about the regulatory burden on firms established
more than a year ago and the other is designed specially for the newly registered start-ups
in order to monitor the administrative costs of entry. Thus, panel data are collected to mon-
itor administrative burden on existing firms from inspections, licensing, etc. and a repeated
cross-section is collected to monitor costs of registration. New start-ups constitute about
20% of the total sample in each MABS round.
The data set used in this paper includes the results of the first five rounds of the MABS
survey conducted in the spring of 2002, the fall of 2002, and the spring of 2003, 2004 and
2005.7 Each round collected information about regulatory burden on firms for the imme-
diately preceding half a year and, in addition, about inspections for the half a year period
before that (i.e., the fifth round took place in the spring of 2005 and collected all variables
system: 1) it significantly increased the scope of application of the existing system of simplified tax admin-
istration which allows small firms to pay a single “unified” tax with a flat rate on either profit or revenue
instead of many taxes, i.e., VAT, profit, sales, and property taxes; and 2) the new law reduced the tax rate
for the “unified” tax. For the vast majority of small firms – and, thus, for firms in our dataset – the law on
simplified tax system changed the tax rate but did not affect tax administration because they already were
eligible to use the “unified” tax. We abstract from laws on certification and simplified tax system because
the law on certification did not introduce clear measurable benchmarks, and therefore, one cannot directly
observe whether it is enforced; and the law on simplified tax system did not affect tax administration for
the vast majority of our sample.
6In this paper we focus exclusively on objective data on regulatory burden because, apart from being
affected by reform, subjective perceptions are influenced by many unobserved factors.
7See CEFIR reports on MABS results at www.cefir.org/index.php?l=eng&id=25.
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for the second half of 2004 and a few variables on inspections for the first half of 2004).
Figure 3 shows the timing of different stages of deregulation reform and the periods
covered by the MABS data. All of the MABS data are in half a year increments. For the
purposes of the analysis in this paper, we assume that the law on inspections took force
after the round 1 and before round 2 of MABS, even though in reality the law took force
in the middle of round 1 (i.e., the second half of 2001). Similarly, we assume that the
law on licenses took force between rounds 2 and 3 (rather than in the middle of round 2).
There are two reasons for making this assumption: first, one should expect at least a few
months lag between the enactment of the law and its implementation; and second, during
the half a year period when each of these laws were enacted, bureaucrats (i.e., inspectors)
may have deliberately shifted their activities earlier in the respective half-year periods in
order to avoid the need to comply with the new laws.8 The timing of the enactment of the
laws on registration fell exactly between the MABS rounds: the first redaction was enacted
between rounds 2 and 3; and the second redaction between rounds 4 and 5.
Thus, the first round of the MABS survey collected the baseline information from the
time before any of the deregulation laws came into force. The data from the second round
onwards allow evaluation of the reform progress after the enactment of the law on inspections;
the data from the third round onwards enable an assessment of the effect of the licensing
law and the first redaction of the law on registration. The last fifth round allows evaluation
of the impact of the second redaction of the registration law.9
1.2.1 The measures of regulation
Table 1 lists all the regulatory measures used in this paper. For each specific type of reg-
ulation affected by deregulation reform, we look at the level of regulatory burden on each
8In the Section 5, we show that the results are similar if we make an alternative assumption that the
reform on inspections and licenses started at the beginning of the second half of 2001 and the first half of
2002, respectively.
9Importantly, the timing of the laws on certification and on simplified tax system is such that they are
not a confounding factor to the deregulation laws that we consider. Both of them were enacted between
rounds 3 and 4 of the MABS survey.
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firm in the sample and at whether it meets the target set by the reform. In particular, for
inspections, we look at the log number of inspections of any agency over the half a year
period and two indicators of the violations of the deregulation target of the maximum num-
ber of inspections: a dummy indicating whether there was more than one inspection by any
inspecting agency over the half a year period and a dummy indicating if there was more
than one inspection by one of the most frequent inspectors – sanitary agency.10
To describe the measures of regulatory burden in the area of licensing, let us first define
terms. We call a license “legitimate” if it is issued for a business activity that is supposed
to be licensed according to the 2002 deregulation law on licenses. In turn, we call a license
“illegitimate” if it is for an activity that is not supposed to be licensed according to the
2002 law. We consider the following measures of licensing regulations for each firm: the log
number of illegitimate licenses; the log term of validity for the legitimate licenses; a dummy
for the presence of an illegitimate license; and a dummy for less than 5-year-term of license
validity. The last two variables measure the failure to meet licensing deregulation targets.
For registration, we look at the log number of agencies a startup visited in order to
register, the log number of days registration took, a dummy for more than one “window”
for registration (i.e., visits to several agencies as opposed to a one-stop-shop registration),
a dummy for more than a week for registration. The two dummies measure the failure to
meet the respective deregulation targets.
Summary statistics for measures of regulation are reported in the Panel A of Table A.1 in
the appendix. The means of variables measuring regulation level (without taking logarithms)
are presented in Figure 2 for each region.11
10These dummies pick out only the extreme violations of the deregulation target, because the law limits
the number of inspections to one in two years, whereas we look at the situations with two or more inspections
in a firm during half a year period. Yet, these extreme violations are not rare: in 2001, a quarter of all firms
had more than one inspection by at least one inspecting agency and 12 percent – by sanitary agency; the
situation improved somewhat by 2004 (three years after the law took force), but the rate of violations of
this deregulation target remained significant: 14.4% and 6.4% of firms for all inspecting agencies and for the
sanitary inspection, respectively.
11Not all the data points are available for all regions and rounds. In particular, there are no data on newly-
registered firms in the round 4 for 11 out of 20 regions. The reason was the resignation of the Russia’s cabinet
which lead to the situation in which nobody in the government knew where the data on the registration of
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2 Hypotheses about the enforcement of deregulation
In this section, we formulate hypotheses about the institutional determinants of progress in
deregulation. We are interested in testing the alternative theories of the nature of regulations:
public interest, regulatory capture, and tollbooth theories. The deregulation reform gives
us a good opportunity to do so because it allows observing the effect of pre-determined,
i.e., pre-reform, institutional characteristics on the local enforcement of exogeneously-given
change in federal regulations. This is an important advantage over many previous studies
because the variation in the levels of regulation and in institutional characteristics can be
simultaneously driven by variation in the unobserved factors.
2.1 Local accountability
It is hard to reconcile the mere presence of deregulation reform with the public interest theory
of regulation (Pigou, 1938); the reason being that the public interest theory of regulation
presumes a benevolent government. If regulations are beneficial, the federal government
could impose a deregulation reform only if it does not serve public interest. In this case, the
prediction of the “refined” public interest theory would be that the more transparent and un-
corrupt – and, therefore, more accountable – local governments do not deregulate as much as
the less accountable to the public local governments. In contrast, the public choice theories
of regulation predict that more accountable governments would exhibit better progress in
deregulation.12 To test the alternative hypotheses about effect of local accountability dereg-
ulation progress, we use measures of regional government transparency, media freedom, and
corruption.
firms were located; these data were needed for sampling of new firms in the round 4 of MABS. In addition,
there are no data for Altaisky Krai in the round 3 due to reorganization of the regional survey agency.
12If, however, in the public interest theory, the more accountable local governments also happen to be
the most obedient ones, then one could argue that they should enforce federal laws better, possibly, even if
they go against public interest. Thus, it is important to control for obedience of the local governments. In
the Section 5, we report that controlling for obedience with a dummy for regional governors-members of the
governing (presidential) party “United Russia” does not affect the results.
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2.2 Fiscal incentives
The public interest theory predicts that regulation should not depend on the sources of gov-
ernment finding. In contrast, the public choice theory predicts that opportunistic politicians
and bureaucrats respond to fiscal incentives (e.g., Brennan and Buchanan, 1980; Buchanan,
1960). In particular, if budgets of local politicians primarily rely on own revenues (i.e.,
local taxes) rather than on discretionary transfers from the federal budget, self-motivated
politicians would have stronger incentives to enforce deregulation laws in order to maximize
budget revenues by fostering business growth (Zhuravskaya, 2000; Jin, Qian and Weingast,
2005). The same logic also gives another prediction of the public choice theory: resource
abundant regions should have worse progress in deregulation compared to regions poorly-
endowed in natural resources because governments of these regions have sufficient slack not
to reform (Egorov, Guriev and Sonin, 2006; Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006). To test
these hypotheses, we use the share of own budgetary revenues in the total regional budget
and an index of regional resource abundance.
2.3 Industrial lobby
We also want to differentiate between the two alterative theories of public choice – the capture
theory (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974; Peltzman, 1976) and the tollbooth theory (McChesney,
1987; de Soto, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). The theory of regulatory capture postulates
that industry incumbents lobby for regulation that protects them from entry of (potential)
competitors and allows them to enjoy high market power. Thus, capture theory predicts
that the presence of politically powerful industrial incumbents should adversely affect re-
form progress in deregulation of entry, i.e., registration and licensing, but should facilitate
deregulation of existing businesses, i.e., inspections. In contrast, in the tollbooth theory, the
rents created by regulation accrue to politicians and bureaucrats, and therefore, there should
be no difference prediction about the regulation of entry, on the one hand, and inspections
of existing business, on the other. We proxy presence of politically powerful industrial lobby
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by an index of industrial concentration and an index of regional state capture.
All institutional measures are described in the data Appendix and summarized in the
Panel B of Table A.1.
3 The enforcement of reform and its determinants
First, we focus on the overall reform progress across all areas of regulation and estimate how
it is affected by the institutional characteristics. Second, as institutions may differently affect
enforcement of reforms in different regulatory areas (as regulatory capture theory predicts),
we study the effect of institutional measures on deregulation progress separately in each
specific area of regulation.
3.1 The implementation of deregulation overall
3.1.1 Methodology, overall level of regulation
We use difference-in-differences (DD) and difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) es-
timators in order to analyze the overall impact of deregulation reform on the actual level of
regulatory burden and – what is our main focus – the institutional determinants of reform
progress. The idea behind our estimation strategy is as follows. We estimate the effect of
deregulation reform on regulatory burden using the difference in the timing of enactment of
different deregulation laws assuming that in the absence of the reform the trends in regula-
tory burden should be similar across different types of regulations. For the estimation of the
institutional determinants of the progress in deregulation, we explore the differential impact
of the federal deregulation laws on regional regulatory burden depending on the regional
institutional environment.
For the purposes of the estimation of the effect of reform on the overall level of regulatory
burden, we construct measures of regulatory burden comparable across types of regulations
as well as across regions and over time. We employ two alternative measures: a proxy for
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the overall level of regulation and a proxy for the overall level of violation of targets set
in deregulation laws in the respective regulatory areas. The construction of both variables
required several steps: First, we selected variables from the MABS survey that measure
regulatory burden along the dimensions targeted by deregulation laws. The measures of the
level of regulatory burden on firms at each point in time are: 1) the number of illegitimate
licenses; 2) the term of license validity; 3) the number of inspections; 4) the number of days
needed for registration, and 5) the number of agencies needed for registration. As measures
of violations of deregulation targets in the respective areas of regulation we take dummies
indicating whether 1) a firm has an illegitimate license; 2) a legitimate license with too short
term of validity; 3) more than one inspection of any agency in half a year; 4) more than one
week for registration; and 5) more than one window for registration. Second, from each of
these variables, we partial out the effect of the basic characteristics of firms, i.e., age, size
allowing for a quadratic term, and (state vs. private) ownership structure by taking residuals
from an OLS regression of our variables on these firm characteristics. This is done because
there is a large variation in regulatory environment faced by firms within each locality; and
this variation is largely explained by the variation in size, age, and ownership of firms.13
Third, we aggregate each of these variables to the level of regions by taking the mean of
each variable across firms in each region at each point in time. Finally, we construct Z-
scores for each of these aggregated variables by subtracting the sample mean and dividing
by standard deviation in order to have comparability across series. The last operation yields
two variables: 1) z-scores measuring the level of regulation for different types of regulations
and 2) z-scores measuring the rate of violations of targets set in deregulation laws. Each of
the two variables varies across five dimensions of regulations, twenty regions, and five points
in time.
The two measures are theoretically distinct because the level of regulation can differ even
13This has been shown using a wide variety of sources in many different countries including the Russian
MAPS data. See, for instance, Carlin, Schaffer and Seabright (2001, 2006); Frye and Zhuravskaya (2000);
CEFIR (2002).
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in situations when all targets of deregulation laws are met or when all of them are violated.
In the latter case, the level of regulation would measure the distance to targets set in the
deregulation laws.
Let us denote either of these two measures by Virt, where i indexes the five regulatory
measures in each group, and r and t index regions and rounds of the MABS survey (i.e.,
our measure of time), respectively. For each of the two measures of the overall regulatory
burden (Virt), we run panel regressions with fixed effects for each dimension of regulation in
each region:
Virt = α(Ir − I¯) ∗AFTERit + βVirt0 ∗AFTERit + γAFTERit + δ′Xrt + φir + ρt + εirt. (1)
The variable AFTERit denotes a dummy indicating whether the respective deregulation law
responsible for the regulatory measure i is in force at time t or not yet. As the timing of reform
differed across different types of regulations (i.e., licensing, inspections, and registration),
“after reform” dummy (AFTERit) varies not only over time but also across regulations i.
The coefficient γ on the “after reform” dummy is a difference-in-differences (DD) estimate
of the average effect of deregulation reform on the overall regulatory burden. Ir denotes a
particular institutional characteristic of a region r which can potentially affect deregulation
progress. It is important to note that our institutional determinants do not vary over time
and are measured in 2000 before the reform had started.14 Our main coefficient of interest,
α, is a DDD estimate of the impact of institutional characteristics (Ir) on the progress of
deregulation reform; more precisely, it estimates the differential effect of deregulation reform
(i.e., the enactment of deregulation laws) on the level of actual regional regulatory burden
in an average region depending on the level of regional institutional characteristic (Ir).
We include the following covariates into the regression equation. τt and φir are the
fixed effects for time and for each regulation measure in each region, respectively. Regula-
14In order to interpret the coefficient γ as the full effect of reform at the mean level of institutional
environment, we subtract the sample mean (I¯) from Ir before taking the cross-term with AFTERit.
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tion*region fixed effects control for all time invariant characteristics of regions and of types
of regulations in each region, including the initial level of regulatory burden. Time fixed ef-
fects control for all global trends and macro-economic events that uniformly affects regional
regulations during the sample period. An important control variable is the interaction of the
initial level of regulatory burden (Virt0) and the “after reform” dummy (AFTERit). The co-
efficient on this interaction measures the extent to which the progress in deregulation reform
depends on the initial level of regulation. If the reform worked perfectly to harmonize (and
lower) the level of regulation across firms, the deregulation progress would have been a linear
transformation of the initial level of regulation. Since the institutional environment (i.e., Ir)
often is correlated with the initial level of regulation, without this covariate one could have
found spurious correlation between the progress of reforms and institutions. The initial time
period (t0) refers to the first round of the MABS survey that measures the benchmark level
of regulatory burden before any of the deregulation laws took effect, i.e., the second half of
2001.15 Xrt is a vector of additional regional covariates; it includes the logarithm of regional
population (to control for the size of the region) and the mean individual income (to control
for prosperity of the region). It is important to note that we correct standard errors to allow
for clustering of error terms (εirt) for all observations within each region that are related
to each of the three types of regulations: registration, licensing, and inspections. (Thus,
we have 60 clusters: 3 types of regulations*20 regions). Clusters take care of two potential
concerns (e.g., Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004): 1) autocorrelation in residuals and
2) cross-sectional correlation among observations from within areas of regulations in each
region.
For the validity of this estimation strategy, we two assumptions subject to holding all co-
variates constant: 1) in the absence of deregulation reform, the different regulatory measures
would have had the same overtime trend; and 2) in the absence of institutional variation
among regions, the impact of reform on each of the regulatory measures would have been
15In the robustness section, we show that our results are robust to using retrospective data for inspections
(in all rounds of MABS). In that case, the benchmark for inspections refers to the first half of 2001.
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the same across regions.
3.1.2 Results: the overall level of regulation
Columns 1 and 6 of Table 2 show that the reforms caused a substantial statistically signif-
icant improvement in the regulatory burden. The coefficient on AFTER is negative and
statistically significant. The enactment of a new deregulation law on average lead to a de-
crease in the level of regulatory burden in the specific regulatory area covered by this law
of 0.4 its standard deviation and to a decrease in the rate of violation of the target set by
this deregulation law of 0.7 of its standard deviation. The latter result translates into a 23
percentage point decrease in the rate of violation of a specific deregulation target on average
following the enactment of the respective deregulation law.
Now let us come to the discussion of the results on determinants of the reform progress
in different regions. Table 2 presents the full regression output for the five institutional
variables – transparency of authorities, industrial concentration, the share of own revenues,
and corruption. We suppress regression results for resource abundance because they are
unrobust – as will become clear below – and for media freedom because it has robust zero
effect on deregulation in all specifications that we ran. Column (1) of Table A.2 presents
abbreviated results, i.e., the point estimates for the coefficients on the interaction between the
institutional measures and “after reform” dummy (α from Equation 1) with their respective
T-statistics for all institutional variables.
Consistent with the public choice theory of regulations, we find significant positive ef-
fect of government transparency, low corruption, strong fiscal incentives, poor endowment
in natural resources, and presence of strong industrial lobbying on the overall progress in
implementation of deregulation reform.
All of these measures have statistically significant estimates of α coefficients in regressions
for the rate of violation of deregulation targets. The effect institutional characteristics is
statistically weaker for the overall level of regulatory burden to the extent that the effects of
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transparency, corruption, and resource abundance on the level of regulation are statistically
insignificant, but the sign of the effect is always consistent with that for the level of violation
of deregulation targets. (Alternative measures of government transparency and of presence of
strong industrial lobbying produce very similar results.) We find no effect of media freedom.
How big are these effects? To analyze the magnitude of the effect of institutional charac-
teristics on the progress of reform, we compare the changes in regulatory burden induced by
the reform for regions, where these institutional characteristics differ by one standard devi-
ation (SD) holding everything else constant. Suppose, in region A the level of government
transparency is one half of its SD above the sample mean and in region B it is one half of
the SD below the mean; then, deregulation reform would lead to a 0.2 SD (or 8 percentage
point) larger compliance with deregulation targets in the region A compared to region B as
a result of reform. Consider now two regions that differ only in the level of corruption; then,
there would be a 0.16 SD difference in the magnitude of a decrease in the level of violation
of deregulation targets as a result of reform in these regions. In the region with higher cor-
ruption, the rate of violation of deregulation targets would decrease by 6 percentage points
lower than in region with low corruption.
Fiscal incentives significantly improve implementation of reforms: there is a 0.2 SD dif-
ference in the magnitude of a decrease both the level of regulation and the level of violation
of deregulation targets as a result of deregulation reform. The latter translates into a differ-
ence of 7 percentage points. As far as the magnitude of the effect of resource abundance is
concerned, a one standard deviation increase in the index of resource richness leads to a 0.13
SD (i.e., 5 percentage point) lower increase in compliance with deregulation targets after the
reform.
Industrial concentration has a significant beneficial impact on both the level of regulation
and on the compliance with targets set by deregulation laws: If one compares two regions
in which industrial concentration of employment differs by one SD, in a region with higher
industrial concentration, the reform should lead to a 0.1 SD larger decrease in the overall
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level of regulation and 0.2 SD (or 6.5 percentage point) larger decrease in the level of violation
of deregulation targets as a result of reform.
The effect of institutional characteristics is estimated holding all other variables including
the initial level of regulation constant. It is worth noting that the initial severely of regulatory
burden itself is a very important determinant of the magnitude of the change following the
reforms. The coefficients on the interaction of the initial level of regulatory burden and “after
reform” dummy are statistically significant and equal to about 0.5 for the level of regulation
and 0.8 for the rate of violation of deregulation targets. Thus, the reform partially equalized
the level of regulatory burden across regions, i.e., a one SD higher initial level of regulation
and a 10 percentage point higher rate of violation of a particular deregulation target leads to
a 0.5 SD higher decrease in the level of regulation and a 8 percentage point higher decrease
in the rate of violation of deregulation laws following the reform.
3.2 The determinants of progress in specific regulatory areas
Section 3.1 established the average effect of institutions on the overall level of regulation.
However, a priori it is not clear whether institutions affect progress in different regulatory
areas in a similar manner or, alternatively, the direction and the magnitude of the effect of
a particular institution differ with regulatory areas. In this section we address the following
questions: What is behind our aggregate results from Section 3.1? Are these results driven
by the effect of institutions on reform progress in a particular regulatory area rather than
all of them? Are there institutions that help reforms in one are of regulation and hamper
reforms in another? In particular, as we discussed in Section 2, the regulatory capture
theory predicts that presence of politically powerful industrial groups may result in low level
of regulation for the incumbent firms (i.e., benign inspections) but high costs of entry (i.e.,
high administrative barriers to registration or obtaining licenses), whereas tollbooth theory
predicts no difference between the effects of institutional characteristics on regulation on
entry and regulation of incumbents.
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The methodology that we use is, again, difference-in-differences. We regress each spe-
cific measure of the actual regulatory burden (and of the enforcement of each deregulation
target) on the interaction between the “after reform” dummy and a measure of a potential
institutional determinant of deregulation (Ir) controlling for time and regional or firm fixed
effect (depending on whether the unit of observation is a firm or a region). For licensing and
inspections, we have firm-level panel data, whereas for registration the data are a repeated
cross-section at the level of firms and a panel at the level of regions; thus, we run firm-level
regressions for licensing and inspections and regional level regressions for all three areas of
regulations.
3.2.1 Methodology, specific regulatory areas
At the level of firms, the estimated regression equation is as follows:
Rft = αIr ∗ AFTERt + βRft0 ∗ AFTERt + δ′Xrt + µ′Zft + φf + ρt + εft. (2)
Subscript f indexes firms; r and t index regions and rounds of the MABS survey, as above.
Rft stands for one of the specific measures of regulatory burden in the areas of licensing
and inspections for which we have firm-level panel data. The measures are listed in Panels
A and B of Table 1. As above, Ir denotes a particular institutional characteristic of a
region r which can potentially affect deregulation progress; and AFTERt denotes a dummy
indicating whether the respective deregulation law is in force or not yet. In contrast to
Equation 1, in Equation 2 “after reform” dummy varies only over time because in each
regression we consider only one specific measure of regulation which was affected by reform
only at one point in time. “After reform” dummy is, therefore, collinear with time dummies
and omitted from the list of regressors. Our primary parameter of interest (α) estimates
the differential effect of the enactment of a specific deregulation law on the level of actual
regulatory burden in an average firm depending on the level of institutional characteristic
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Ir. ρt and φf stand for time and firm fixed effects, respectively. As in Equation 1, we control
for the interaction of the “after reform” dummy with the initial (before reform) level of
regulatory burden (Rft0). The list of regional covariates (Xrt) remains the same. As severity
of regulations varies with size, age, and ownership type of firms, we include the following
vector of firm-level controls (Zft): the log of firm’s employment with a quadratic term, the
number of years since the firm’s foundation, a dummy for state (vs. private) ownership, and
a dummy for newly created startups.16 In Specification 2, we correct standard errors to allow
for clustering of error terms (εft) within each firm to account for residual autocorrelation.
Similarly, we run regional-level regressions, in which we aggregate measures of regulatory
burden in firms by taking means of each specific measure of regulatory burden at each point
in time for all firms in each region. Prior to aggregation, we partial out the effect of firm
characteristics as for Equation 1. Let us refer to the resulting regional-level measures of
regulations as Rrt. In the regional level panel, data allow us to measure regulatory burden
associated with all three areas of regulation: licensing, inspections, and registration. The
regression equation is analogous to the firm-level regression Equation 2, with only difference
being that the unit of analysis at each point in time is a region rather than a firm:
Rrt = αIr ∗ AFTERt + βRrt0 ∗ AFTERt + δ′Xrt + φr + ρt + εrt. (3)
The notation is the same as in Equation 2. Again, the coefficient α is of our primary interest;
it is a difference-in-differences estimator of the average effect of institutions on the regional
reform progress in each specific area of regulation.
The main assumption necessary for the validity of this DD methodology is that in the
absence of institutional variation the average change in regulatory burden as a result of
reform would have been the same across regions for a given level of X and Z.
16The information on licensing is available for startups and old firms; whereas information on inspections
is available only for old firms.
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3.2.2 Results: determinants of reform progress, specific regulations
Columns 2 and 3 of Table A.2 present the point estimates for the coefficients on the inter-
action between “after reform” dummy and the institutional characteristics from Equations
2 and 3, respectively, for all regressions, i.e., all available measures of regulatory burden.
Tables 3 and 4 report full regression output after estimation of Equations 2 and 3, respec-
tively, for regressions with the four selected institutional measures (that were also featured
in Table 2): transparency of authorities, industrial concentration, the share of own revenues,
and corruption.
We find that industrial concentration, government transparency, and the share of own
revenues have statistically significant beneficial impact on reform progress in registration,
licensing, and inspections. In particular, there is no difference in the direction of the effect
for entry regulations and regulations of existing businesses of our proxies for the presence
of politically-powerful industrial lobbies: industrial concentration significantly reduces the
probability that following the deregulation reform a firm has more than one sanitary in-
spection in half a year period, an illegitimate licence, and visits more than one agency for
registration. The same is true for the share of own revenues and government transparency.
As far as corruption is concerned, it has a significant adverse effect on reform progress in
licensing and registration, and adverse, but statistically insignificant effect on deregulation
in the area of inspections. At the same time, we also find no effect of any of these institutions
on reform progress in reducing the number of days for registration and only transparency
has some (and rather weak) effect on lengthening the term of license validity which shows
up significant only in regional-level regressions. It is plausible, however, that length of
license validity changes only with a lag; in particular, this would be the case if the starting
and ending times of licenses are correlated across firms. Overall, the results are broadly
consistent for regional and firm-level regressions.
The economic significance of these results is as follows. A one SD increase in the HH
index of industrial employment leads to a 2.5% lower number of illegitimate licenses per firm,
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a 1.5 percentage point larger decrease in the probability for an average established firm to
be inspected by the sanitary agency, and a 9 percentage point larger decrease in the number
of agencies visited for registration by an average startup as a result of deregulation. A one
SD increase in transparency of authorities leads the following improvement in the progress of
deregulation reform for an average firm: a 3% larger decrease in the number of illegitimate
licenses, a 4% larger increase in the length of license validity, a 22% larger decrease in the
number of agencies visited for registration, and a one percentage point larger drop in the
probability to have more than one inspection of any regulatory agency in half a year period.
A one SD increase in the share of own revenues leads to a 1% larger decrease in the number
of illegitimate licenses per firm, a 1 percentage point larger decrease in the probability to be
inspected by the sanitary agency, and a 6% larger decrease in the number of agencies visited
for registration.17
In the previous section of the paper, we showed that resource abundance slowed down
the reform on average. The estimation of the effect of resource abundance on the specific
areas of regulation produces no statistically significant results (see Table A.2): none of
the α coefficients is even close to being significant. Thus, we deem the result on resource
abundance unrobust. Again, we find absolutely no correlation of the media freedom variable
with progress in any dimension of reform. Thus, media has been insufficiently strong to help
the public to establish control over bureaucracy.18
To summarize, our main finding in this section is that industrial concentration, govern-
ment transparency, and fiscal incentives consistently significantly affected implementation of
reform in all areas of regulation. Particularly interesting is the result on industrial concen-
tration which suggests that this is not the case the industry incumbents lobby for an increase
in entry regulations while keeping regulations on their own activities (such as inspections)
17For licensing and inspections, the computation of economic significance is based on the results of firm-
level regressions.
18Another explanation of this fact is, of course, attenuation bias due to measurement errors in media
freedom variable. Yet, this variable had been used by a number of other papers that show it to be a
reasonably good proxy for the actual state of press freedom in the Russian regions as of 2000 (e.g., Akhmedov
and Zhuravskaya, 2004; Gehlbach, Sonin and Zhuravskaya, 2006).
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low. This result contrasts with the prediction of regulatory capture theory and is consistent
with the tollbooth theory of the nature of regulations.
4 The consequences of deregulation
An important question for testing between public choice and public interest theories of
regulation is whether regulation of different areas of economy is beneficial or detrimental
to social welfare, growth, and development. Political and development economists have
addressed this question in many different contexts (e.g., de Soto, 1990, 2000; Djankov et al.,
2002; Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002; Botero et al., 2004; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes
and Shleifer, 2003; Aghion et al., 2006). A common problem with figuring out the effect
of regulation on any of the outcomes is endogeneity of regulation. On the one hand, under
the public interest theory, benevolent regulators should regulate more in places where there
are higher market failures. This could lead to a reverse causality from poor outcomes (e.g.,
poor quality of goods or pollution) to higher levels of regulation. On the other hand, under
the public choice theory, predatory regulators may be disproportionately attracted to places
where there is thriving business growth because they can generate more rents by preying
on successful and profitable firms. This, in contrast, could lead to a reverse causality from
business growth to higher levels of regulation. Without finding an exogenous source of
variation in regulation, causal claims based on correlation between regulatory burden and
economic outcomes are problematic.
Russia’s deregulation reform is a policy experiment that allows us finding instruments to
solve the problem of endogeneity of regulation. Our main goal in this section is to establish
a causal relationship going from the level of regulation to such outcomes as (net) entry, small
business employment, pollution, and morbidity. Our analysis presented in the Section 3 of
the paper helps to identify the sources of exogenous variation in regulatory burden. We
use the interactions of AFTER with institutional measures (I) and with the initial level of
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regulatory environment as instruments to predict regulation. Thus, we estimate 2SLS where
the first stage is Equation 3 and the second stage is as follows:
Srt = αRrt + β
′Xrt + φr + ρt + εrt, (4)
The dependent variable (Srt) stands for one of the following outcomes: (net) entry mea-
sured by the log number of small businesses in the region, small business employment mea-
sured by the number of people employed by small businesses per 1,000 of total regional
population, pollution measured by the emissions of contaminants into the atmosphere, and
public health measured by morbidity from injuries and poisoning per 1,000 population. The
rest of the notation is as in Equation 3. In particular, Rrt stands for the specific regional-level
measures of regulation.
4.1 Results: the effect of deregulation on outcomes
First, let us consider the estimation of the effect of regulation on the log number of small
businesses per capita and on the small business employment; the results are presented in Ta-
bles 5 and 6. 2SLS regressions show a statistically significant negative effect of the following
regulations on net entry: high frequency of sanitary inspections, high number of illegitimate
licenses, and short length of license validity for legitimate licenses (as reported in columns
2, 4, and 6 of Table 5). The effect of the share of firms with more than one agency for
registration in the region has a negative but statistically insignificant effect on entry. In
addition, frequency of sanitary inspections and the share of firms that had to visit more
than one agency in order to register have a significant negative effect on the employment
by small businesses (see columns 2 and 8 in Table 6). Licensing regulations (i.e., length of
license validity and the number illegitimate licenses) do not have a significant effect on small
business employment.
The magnitude of the estimated causal effects of regulatory environment on entry and
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employment is as follows. A one standard deviation increase in the share of firms with
more than one sanitary inspection in a region leads to a 7.9% lower share of small business
employment and a 9.4% lower number of small businesses per capita. A one standard
deviation increase in the share of firms with more than just one agency needed for registration
leads to a 9.3% lower regional employment by small businesses. A one standard deviation
increase in the log number of licenses per firm and a one standard deviation decrease in the
log length of license validity per firm in a region lead to 5.6 and 8.9 percent increases in the
number of small businesses per capita in this region.
We do not consider how the time needed for registration influences entry or small business
because – as we found in section 3.2 – considered institutional determinants of deregulation
progress did not significantly affect reform progress in this particular area and, therefore, we
do not have sufficiently good instruments for it.19
In order to illustrate the direction and size of the bias in uninstrumented regressions,
in addition to the results of the second stage of the 2SLS specification (Equation 4), for
each regulatory measure we present results of the simple OLS regressions. The bias in
uninstrumented OLS estimates (for both the number and employment of small businesses)
is positive and rather large. This is consistent with the the view that predatory regulators
are attracted to environments with more vibrant and growing business.20
The instruments used for each of the regulatory measures in estimation of the effect of
regulation on entry and business growth differ only by the timing of “after reform” dummy
(which multiplies the same institutional determinants of the deregulation success) and, there-
fore, are correlated. Therefore, the interpretation of the results requires a word of caution:
the instruments do not allow us to distinguish between the effects of changes in different di-
19The tables report Hansen J-statistic for each 2SLS regression along with the respective p-value for
the test of overidentification restrictions; the test yields that the model is correctly specified in each case.
In addition, we report F-statistics for excluded instruments; they indicate that explanatory power of the
instruments in reported regressions is sufficiently high not to run into a problem of weak instruments.
20Such endogeneity of regulation can explain why Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2004) find that more
benign entry regulations are not associated with higher entry in corrupt countries whereas there is a strong
relationship in uncorrupt countries.
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mensions of regulation; instead, we estimate the causal effect of the whole cluster regulations
associated with inspections, licensing, and registration on the outcomes. Thus, the results
should be interpreted as the finding that deregulation in general is beneficial for entry and
small business growth.
Now let us turn to the estimation of the causal effect of regulation on pollution and mor-
bidity. Table 7 presents the results: we find no significant effect of regulation on emissions
or morbidity. This is contrary to the predictions of the public interest theory that regula-
tions correct such market failures as pollution externalities or provision of toxic goods by
neglectful fly-by-night businesses. It is worth mentioning that there is no systematic bias in
uninstrumented regressions (thus, we report only the results of 2SLS regressions and omit
OLS regression output). The absence of a bias in uninstrumented regressions for pollution
and morbidity is itself a piece of evidence against the public interest theory as it predicts an
upward bias.
5 Robustness
In this section, we describe various robustness checks for our baseline results.
First, the results are robust to controlling for region-specific linear trends in estimation of
Equations 1 and 2 and to controlling for a linear trend interacted with AFTER in estimation
of Equations 3 and 4. The direction and magnitude of the effects does not change after
inclusion of these controls; some of the results lose significance, but many remain statistically
significant.
Second, our results do not depend on the inclusion of the regional control variables, i.e.,
population and income.
Third, the results are robust to using the alternative assumption about the timing of the
laws on inspections and licensing vis-a`-vis the monitoring rounds. In reality, deregulation
laws on inspections and licenses took place in the middle of the MABS rounds. In the
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case of inspections, to check robustness, we use the retrospective data about the number of
inspections a year before each of the MABS rounds. This needs to be done for all the rounds
because of a significant recall bias: firm managers tend to forget about inspections that took
place a year ago and systematically understate their number. In the case of licensing, we
assume that the reform started from the second round onwards. The results that we get
under the alternative assumption about the timing are consistent, but somewhat weaker. In
most cases, however, they remain significant.
Fourth, we re-run Equations 1, 2, and 3 with an additional covariate: an interaction of
AFTER with the dummy indicating whether the regional governor belongs to the governing
“United Russia” party. This is done in order to control for obedient local governments. All
results using our proxies for local accountability (transparency and absence of corruption)
become slightly stronger with inclusion of this additional control variable. None of the other
results are affected. The progress of reform itself is also unaffected by whether the governor
belongs to the governing party.
Finally, we repeat the analysis for an additional measure of regulatory burden – the
average cost of obtaining one license. The results that we get qualitatively are very similar
to those for other measures of regulation. In particular, government transparency, fiscal
incentives, and industrial concentration are associated with a significantly higher decrease in
the average cost of licenses after the licensing reform as estimated by Equation 2. (Estimation
of Equation 3 yields effects of similar magnitude but lower statistical significance: only the
effect of government transparency remains significant. For other measures, the values of
t-statistic never fall below unity.) This measure, however, is very noisy because it averages
the costs of obtaining legitimate and illegitimate licenses. Since the reform affected only the
cost of legitimate licenses, we do not use this measure in our baseline analysis.
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6 Conclusions
We analyze firm-level panel data on the regulatory burden of firms in Russia during a period
of a drastic deregulation reform. Our findings are as follows. Deregulation reform signifi-
cantly lowered the actual regulatory burden on Russian firms on average; reform progress,
however, exhibited a vast regional variation. Four institutional factors had robust, statisti-
cally significant, and economically strong effect on the implementation of deregulation reform
in the Russian regions: government transparency, low corruption, fiscal incentives (i.e., the
extent to which regional budgets are comprised of own revenues rather than transfers from
the federal center), and the presence of strong industrial lobby. These factors are associated
with better reform progress both in the area of entry regulations and of the regulations of
businesses already in operation. Using the timing of reform and the determinants of its
success as exogenous sources of variation in regulatory burden, we show that deregulation
had significant positive causal effect on SME entry and employment and had no (adverse)
effect on pollution and public health.
This evidence is inconsistent with public interest theory of the nature regulations: first,
regions with transparent and accountable governments are the ones that achieve progress
in deregulation, and second, deregulation does not have an adverse effect on pollution or
morbidity. The evidence is also difficult to reconcile with regulatory capture theory: there
is no evidence that strong politically-powerful lobby of industrial incumbents slows down
deregulation of entry. In contrast, the evidence is fully consistent with tollbooth theory of
regulation (de Soto, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Djankov et al., 2002): the least corrupt
and most fiscally-motivated locally-accountable governments promote deregulation the most.
References
Aghion, Philipee, Robin Burgess, Stephen Redding and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2006. The Unequal
Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in India. NBER
Working Papers 12031 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
28
Aghion, Philippe, Robin Burgess, Stephen Redding and Fabrizio Zilibotti. 2005. “Entry Lib-
eralization and Inequality in Industrial Performance.” Journal of the European Economic
Association 3(2-3):291–302.
Akhmedov, Akhmed and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2004. “Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test
in a Young Democracy Setting.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(4):1301–1338.
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004. “How Much Should
We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
119(1):249–275.
Bertrand, Marianne and Francis Kramarz. 2002. “Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Cre-
ation? Evidence From The French Retail Industry.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
117(4):1369–1413.
Botero, Juan, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes and An-
drei Shleifer. 2004. “The Regulation of Labor.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics
119(4):1339–1382.
Boycko, Maxim, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 1995. Privatizing Russia. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Brennan, Geoffrey and James M. Buchanan. 1980. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations
of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, James M. 1960. Fiscal Theory and Political Economy. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press.
Buev, Vladimir V., Olga A. Makarova and Alexey O. Shehovtzov. 2005. Recommendations
for Deregulation Reform in the Area of Licensing Entrepreneurial Activity: EU-Russia Co-
operation Program “Deregulation of Economy and Removal of Administrative Barriers”.
Technical report. In Russian. EUROPEAID/114008/C/SV/RU.
Carlin, Wendy, Mark Schaffer and Paul Seabright. 2001. “Competition and Enterprise Per-
formance in Transition Economies: Evidence from a Cross-country Survey.” CEPR Dis-
cussion Paper No. 2840.
Carlin, Wendy, Mark Schaffer and Paul Seabright. 2006. “What are the Real Bottlenecks?
A Lagrangian Approach to Identifying Constraints on Growth from Survey Data.” CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 5719.
CEFIR. 2002. Monitoring of Administrative Barriers to Small Business Devel-
opment: Results of Round 1, CEFIR Policy Report No.5. Technical report.
http://www.cefir.org/download.php?id=87; http://www.cefir.org/download.php?id=208.
de Soto, Hernando. 1990. The Other Path. New York: Harper and Row.
de Soto, Hernando. 2000. The Mystery Of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West
and Fails Everywhere Else. New York: Random House.
29
Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh and Rita Ramalho. 2006. “Regulation and Growth.”
Economics Letters 92(3):395–401.
Djankov, Simeon, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes and Andrei
Shleifer. 2003. “The New Comparative Economics.” Journal of Comparative Economics
31(4):595–619.
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes and Andrei Shleifer. 2002.
“The Regulation of Entry.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(1):1–37.
Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes and Andrei Shleifer. 2003.
“Courts.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(2):453–517.
Egorov, Georgy, Sergei Guriev and Konstantin Sonin. 2006. “Media Freedom, Bureaucratic
Incentives, and the Resource Curse.” Unpublished manuscript.
Frye, Timothy and Andrei Shleifer. 1997. “The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand.”
American Economic Review 87(2):354–358.
Frye, Timothy and Ekatherina Zhuravskaya. 2000. “Rackets, Regulation and the Rule of
Law.” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 16(2):478–502.
Gehlbach, Scott, Konstantin Sonin and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2006. “Businessman Candi-
dates.” Unpublished manuscript.
Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. “Protection for Sale.” American Economic
Review 84(4):833–850.
Jin, Hehui, Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast. 2005. “Regional decentralization and fiscal
incentives: Federalism, Chinese style.” Journal of Public Economics 89(9-10):1719–1742.
Johnson, Simon, Daniel Kaufmann and Andrei Shleifer. 1998. “The Unofficial Economy in
Transition.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2):159–239.
Klapper, Leora, Luc Laeven and Raghuram G Rajan. 2004. “Business Environment and
Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4366.
McChesney, Fred S. 1987. “Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of
Regulation.” Journal of Legal Studies 16:101–118.
Mulligan, Casey B. and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. “Conscription as Regulation.” NBERWorking
Paper No. 10558.
Mulligan, Casey B. and Andrei Shleifer. 2005. “The Extent of the Market and the Supply
of Regulation.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120(4):1445–1473.
Peltzman, Sam. 1976. “Toward a More General Theory of Regulation.” Journal of Law and
Economics 19(2):211–240.
Pigou, Arthur. 1938. The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan.
30
Posner, Richard A. 1974. “Theories of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics
5(2):335–358.
Qian, Yingyi and Barry Weingast. 1996. “China’s Transition to Markets: Market-Preserving
Federalism, Chinese Style.” Journal of Policy Reform 1(2):149–185.
Robinson, James A., Ragnar Torvik and Thierry Verdier. 2006. “Political Foundations of
the Resource Curse.” Journal of Development Economics 79(2):447–468.
Shehovtzov, Alexey O., Sergey V. Migin, Alexander V. Demin and Alexey S. Belov. 2005.
Evolution of State Policy in the Area of Deregulation and Debureaucratization, and of Re-
moval of Administrative Barriers to Entrepreneurship: EU-Russia Cooperation Program
“Deregulation of Economy and Removal of Administrative Barriers”. Technical report. In
Russian. EUROPEAID/114008/C/SV/RU.
Shleifer, Andrei. 1997. “Government in Transition.” European Economic Review 41(3-5):385–
410.
Shleifer, Andrei. 2005. “Understanding Regulation.” European Financial Management
11(4):439–451.
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. 1993. “Corruption.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
108(3):599–617.
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. 1998. The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies
and Their Cures. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Slinko, Irina, Evgeny Yakovlev and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2005. “Laws for Sale: Evidence
from Russian Regions.” American Law and Economics Review 7(1):284–318.
Stigler, George J. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics
2(1):3–21.
World Bank, The. 2006. Doing Business 2007: How to Reform. Washington, D.C.: The
World Bank and The International Finance Corporation.
Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina V. 2000. “Incentives to Provide Local Public Goods: Fiscal Feder-
alism, Russian Style.” Journal of Public Economics 76(3):337–368.
31
1
I:2
00
1
2
I:2
00
2
3
II:
20
02
4
II:
20
03
5
II:
20
04
In
sp
e
ct
io
ns
>
1
Le
ng
th
o
fl
ic
e
ns
e
va
lid
ity
<
5
ye
ar
s
Ille
git
im
at
e
lic
e
ns
e
s
>
0
Da
ys
fo
r
re
gis
tra
tio
n
>
5
W
in
do
w
s
fo
r
re
gis
tra
tio
n
>
1
0%10
%
20
%
30
%
40
%
50
%
60
%
70
%
80
%
90
%
Sh
ar
e
of
vi
ola
tio
n
s
1
I:2
00
1
2
I:2
00
2
3
II:
20
02
4
II:
20
03
5
II:
20
04
In
sp
e
ct
io
ns
Le
ng
th
o
fl
ic
e
ns
e
va
lid
ity
Ille
gi
tim
at
e
lic
e
ns
e
s
Da
ys
fo
r
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n
W
in
do
w
s
fo
r
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n
-1
.2
5-1
-0
.7
5
-0
.5
-0
.2
50
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
.7
51
1
.2
5
R
eg
u
la
ti
on
Z
-s
co
re
s
F
ig
u
re
1
:
T
h
e
L
ev
el
of
V
io
la
ti
on
of
D
er
eg
u
la
ti
on
T
ar
ge
ts
(l
ef
t)
an
d
th
e
L
ev
el
of
R
eg
u
la
ti
on
(r
ig
h
t)
S
tr
ip
ed
C
ol
u
m
n
s
In
d
ic
at
e
T
im
e
B
ef
or
e
R
ef
or
m
(s
p
ec
ifi
c
fo
r
ea
ch
ar
ea
of
re
gu
la
ti
on
)
32
M e a n n u m b e r o f i l le g it im a t e l ic e n s e s
0
0 .5
1
1 .5
2
2 .5
3
3 .5
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0
M e a n n um b e r o f in s p e ct io n s p e r f irm
0
0 .5
1
1 .5
2
2 .5
3
3 .5
4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0
M ean term of license validity
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
M ean num be r o f days fo r re gis tra tio n
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Mean number of agencies for registration
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5
X
X
X
X
X X X X X X X X X X X X XX X
X X X X X X X X X X X XX X
Figure 2: Regional Variation in Deregulation
Regions: 1-Komi Republic, 2-Altaisky Krai, 3-Krasnoyarsky Krai, 4-Primorsky Krai, 5-Khabarovsky Krai,
6-Amurskaya Oblast, 7-Kaluzhskaya Oblast, 8- Kurganskaya Oblast, 9-Moskovskaya Oblast,
10-Nizhegorodskaya Oblast, 11-Novosibirskaya Oblast, 12-Permskaya Oblast, 13-Rostovskaya Oblast,
14-Samarskaya Oblast, 15- Saratovskaya Oblast, 16-Sakhalinskaya Oblast, 17-Smolenskskaya Oblast,
18-Chelyabinskaya Oblast, 19-Moscow City, 20- St.Petersburg City. “X” denotes missing data.
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A Appendix
Institutional measures
The measures of local accountability
The regional indices on the overall transparency of authorities, transparency of legislative and of executive
branches of regional governments, and the transparency of regional judiciary come from an independent infor-
mational agency “Strana.ru” and an independent association of journalists “Media Soyuz.” In the paper, we
report results for the overall transparency of authorities; the results using the other measures of government
transparency are very similar. These indices were constructed on the basis of a survey of more than a thou-
sand prominent regional journalists who were asked to evaluate performance of the regions along the following
dimensions: accessibility and accuracy of information about decisions of a particular regional authority, im-
partiality and easiness of journalist accreditation rules, quickness of response on journalist inquiries, presence
and quality of internet site, etc. The transparency ratings are available at www.strana.ru/print/128316.html.
An index of regional media freedom was collected and published by the nongovernmental organization “Pub-
lic Expertise,” which measures restrictions in regional legislation on information dissemination through the
media. This rating can be found at www.freepress.ru/arh e.shtml. An index of regional corruption was con-
structed by Transparency International jointly with the Information for Democracy foundation (INDEM) on
the basis of a an opinion survey among regionally-representative samples of managers of small and medium-
size firms and of population about their perceptions of corruption. As our measure of corruption we take
the log of the “corruption volume” variable available at www.anti-corr.ru/rating regions/index.htm.
The measures of fiscal incentives
The share of own budgetary revenues in the total regional budget is used as a simple (and rather crude)
proxy for the regional fiscal incentives. The data come from the Treasury of the Russian Federation
(www.roskazna.ru/reports/mb.html). A regional index of resource abundance was constructed by the “Ex-
pert RA” Rating Agency; it is available at: www.raexpert.ru/ratings/regions/.
The measures of the industrial lobbying
We use three alternative variables to proxy for the political power of industry incumbents. Each of these
proxies is imperfect. Yet, even though they are constructed in different ways and from different data sources,
they are correlated and produce similar results. Thus, we are reasonably confident that these measures
pick up the effect of lobbying by politically-powerful firms. The first two measures are the concentration
(Herfindahl-Hirschman) indices of sales and of employment among industrial firms in each region. The
logic behind the choice of industrial concentration as proxy for the strength of industrial lobbying is as in
Grossman and Helpman (1994). The source of these data is the Russia’s Industrial Registry. The third
proxy is a measure of regional regulatory capture constructed by and described in Slinko, Yakovlev and
Zhuravskaya (2005). This is the concentration of preferential treatments (i.e., subsidies, tax breaks, etc.)
given to large firms in each region by the regional laws and regulations. This variable reflects the extent to
which political power is concentrated in the hands of a few large firms. In the paper, we report results using
the HHI of employment, but the results using other proxies are similar.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Regulation measures
Minus log (term of license validity) 3946 -3.564 0.612 -5.784 -0.693
Log number of illegitimate licenses 7652 0.298 0.605 0 5.889
Too short term of license validity 3951 0.393 0.489 0 1
Presence of illegitimate licenses 7652 0.266 0.442 0 1
More than one sanitary inspection 7557 0.084 0.277 0 1
Log number of inspections 7640 0.722 0.750 0 3.951
More than one inspection of any agency 7652 0.189 0.391 0 1
Log days for registration 681 2.762 0.852 0.262 5.903
More than one week to register 845 0.729 0.445 0 1
Log number of windows for registration 684 1.446 0.554 0 3.045
More than one window for registration 848 0.722 0.448 0 1
Overall regulation level (z-scores) 465 -0.002 0.997 -2.478 4.066
Overall violations of the law (z-scores) 465 0.000 0.997 -2.766 3.371
Overall violations of the law (without z-scores) 467 0.450 0.350 0 1
Panel B: Institutional determinants
Overall transparency of regional authorities 20 7.478 4.014 0.060 15.860
Transparency of executive power 20 4.224 2.248 0.030 8.750
Transparency of legislative power 20 3.254 1.872 0.030 7.110
Transparency of courts 20 2.221 1.615 0.090 6.940
Log corruption score 16 3.796 0.789 2.442 4.605
Concentration of industrial output 20 0.219 0.099 0.122 0.528
Concentration of industrial employment 20 0.178 0.077 0.110 0.385
Concentration of preferential treatments 20 0.535 0.238 0.209 0.907
Share of own revenues 20 0.829 0.117 0.592 0.959
Media freedom index 20 42.040 12.650 18 75
Resource richness index 20 39.150 26.704 2 89
Governor from the governing party 20 0.721 0.413 0 1
Panel C: Outcomes
SME employment 99 0.053 0.038 0.019 0.200
Log number of small businesses 99 2.559 1.133 0.875 5.282
Log emissions of contaminants 99 5.152 1.172 2.425 7.859
Morbidity from injuries and poisoning 99 92.085 18.352 54.100 129.000
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Table A.2: Account of All Results for the Effect of Institutions
1 2 3
Institution: Type: Variable: Overall regulation Specific regulations Specific regulations
Panel of regions Panel of firms Panel of regions
Coef abs(T-stat) Coef abs(T-stat) Coef abs(T-stat)
Transparency ALL regulation level -0.048 [1.45]
ALL violation of deregulation targets -0.058 [3.00]***
INSP log number of inspections 0.003 [0.82] -0.007 [0.90]
INSP more than one inspection of any agency -0.003 [1.09] -0.004 [1.35]
INSP more than one sanitary inspection -0.003 [1.84]* -0.003 [2.38]**
LIC log number of illegitimate licenses -0.007 [2.88]*** -0.011 [2.19]**
LIC presence of illegitimate licenses -0.008 [3.37]*** -0.005 [3.06]***
LIC minus log term of license validity 0.000 [0.09] -0.010 [2.09]**
LIC too short length of license validity -0.001 [0.32] 0.001 [0.15]
REGIST log number of windows for registration -0.051 [2.48]**
REGIST more than one window for registration -0.050 [2.87]***
REGIST log number of days for registration 0.003 [0.15]
REGIST more than 5 days for registration 0.014 [1.21]
Corruption ALL regulation level 0.161 [1.23]
ALL violation of deregulation targets 0.218 [1.95]*
INSP log number of inspections 0.020 [0.94] 0.032 [0.96]
INSP more than one inspection of any agency 0.008 [0.65] 0.014 [0.86]
INSP more than one sanitary inspection -0.003 [0.31] 0.003 [0.37]
LIC log number of illegitimate licenses 0.027 [1.96]* 0.057 [2.30]**
LIC presence of illegitimate licenses 0.017 [1.32] 0.016 [1.16]
LIC minus log term of license validity 0.012 [0.55] -0.024 [0.70]
LIC too short length of license validity -0.001 [0.04] 0.020 [0.89]
REGIST log number of windows for registration 0.057 [0.64]
REGIST more than one window for registration 0.139 [1.80]*
REGIST log number of days for registration 0.026 [0.22]
REGIST more than 5 days for registration 0.033 [0.50]
Fiscal incentives ALL regulation level -1.798 [2.43]**
ALL violation of deregulation targets -1.691 [3.27]***
INSP log number of inspections 0.019 [0.14] -0.141 [0.61]
INSP more than one inspection of any agency -0.099 [1.27] -0.098 [0.90]
INSP more than one sanitary inspection -0.126 [2.17]** -0.093 [1.60]
LIC log number of illegitimate licenses -0.160 [1.84]* -0.341 [2.48]**
LIC presence of illegitimate licenses -0.165 [2.10]** -0.012 [0.22]
LIC minus log term of license validity 0.043 [0.34] -0.019 [0.11]
LIC too short length of license validity -0.016 [0.20] 0.041 [0.35]
REGIST log number of windows for registration -0.853 [1.94]*
REGIST more than one window for registration -1.317 [3.79]***
REGIST log number of days for registration -0.442 [0.72]
REGIST more than 5 days for registration -0.366 [0.99]
Resource abundance ALL regulation level 0.002 [0.54]
ALL violation of deregulation targets 0.005 [2.04]**
INSP log number of inspections 0.0007 [1.24] 0.0007 [0.89]
INSP more than one inspection of any agency 0.0003 [0.80] 0.0004 [1.33]
INSP more than one sanitary inspection 0.0001 [0.20] 0.0001 [0.57]
LIC log number of illegitimate licenses 0.0002 [0.53] 0.0003 [0.46]
LIC presence of illegitimate licenses 0.0004 [1.20] -0.0001 [0.39]
LIC minus log term of license validity -0.0006 [0.99] -0.0010 [1.23]
LIC too short length of license validity 0.0000 [0.08] 0.0003 [0.60]
REGIST log number of windows for registration 0.0005 [0.12]
REGIST more than one window for registration 0.0015 [0.57]
REGIST log number of days for registration -0.0004 [0.12]
REGIST more than 5 days for registration 0.0004 [0.24]
Large business lobby ALL regulation level -1.431 [2.37]**
ALL violation of deregulation targets -1.869 [3.75]***
INSP log number of inspections 0.060 [0.48] -0.110 [0.59]
INSP more than one inspection of any agency -0.066 [0.97] -0.049 [0.46]
INSP more than one sanitary inspection -0.104 [2.05]** -0.074 [1.81]*
LIC log number of illegitimate licenses -0.318 [4.24]*** -0.497 [3.79]***
LIC presence of illegitimate licenses -0.343 [4.96]*** -0.148 [3.00]***
LIC minus log term of license validity 0.026 [0.22] -0.025 [0.12]
LIC too short length of license validity -0.070 [0.98] -0.171 [1.38]
REGIST log number of windows for registration -0.201 [0.36]
REGIST more than one window for registration -0.517 [1.03]
REGIST log number of days for registration -0.273 [0.43]
REGIST more than 5 days for registration -0.054 [0.15]
Media freedom Overall regulation level 0.005 [0.74]
Overall violation of deregulation targets 0.005 [0.88]
INSP log number of inspections 0.001 [1.10] -0.001 [0.42]
INSP more than one inspection of any agency 0.000 [0.14] -0.001 [0.91]
INSP more than one sanitary inspection 0.000 [0.21] -0.001 [1.40]
LIC log number of illegitimate licenses 0.000 [0.41] 0.000 [0.22]
LIC presence of illegitimate licenses 0.000 [0.54] 0.000 [0.17]
LIC minus log term of license validity 0.000 [0.13] -0.001 [0.34]
LIC too short length of license validity 0.000 [0.38] 0.001 [0.81]
REGIST log number of windows for registration 0.001 [0.21]
REGIST more than one window for registration -0.002 [0.30]
REGIST log number of days for registration 0.000 [0.03]
REGIST more than 5 days for registration 0.003 [1.27]
Note: “LIC,” “INSP,” “REGIST,” and “ALL” denote different types of regulation: licensing, inspections,
and registration, and measures of the overall regulatory burden, respectively.
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